Jean-Paul Baillargeon, editor - The Handing Down of Culture, Smaller Societies and Globalization

Chapter 2 | John Meisel

(continued)

In the face of such issues two camps emerge: established citizens fearing that their familiar world is being torn asunder, and newcomers ill at ease because their cultures are not recognized as legitimate (Bissoondath, 1994; Bibby, 1990; Taylor, 1992). In Canada where traditions of civility are well established, a compromise emerges over time which is tolerable to both sides without satisfying either completely. But whatever the reactions of the groups involved, the result is a fundamental transformation of the host state. The arts now reflect the metamorphosis and many cultural institutions are learning to adjust to it. Museums and galleries, books by “non-mainstream” authors, programs of the granting councils, and broadcasting programs illustrate the fact that the cultural community no longer consists principally of Canadians of French or British origin; it is now much more heterogeneous and steeped in traditions which reflect the emergent global village.

The new diversity affects globalization in at least two ways: By strengthening domestic cultural creativity, it provides something of a shield against globalization. Secondly, by leading to heterogeneous and cosmopolitan works, it facilitates communication between Canadian creators and their colleagues elsewhere in the world, without necessarily detracting from the indigenous quality of either. The more textured and more varied the cultural nature and experience of a country, the better it will likely fit into, and collaborate with, the newly emerging disparate and multifarious world.

These reflections make it unavoidable to confront one of the most difficult questions faced by students of culture: what is the relationship between it and a sense of national identity? Numerous entire colloquia and libraries of books have addressed this issue without resolving it. In this paper I can do little more than breathe its name. If there is one single overriding thread animating this paper, it is its emphasis on the immense complexity and richly layered nature of the principal terms of our discourse — culture, globalization, Canadian. We must add another equally ambiguous and labyrinthine notion: “national,” as in “national identity.”

There is, to begin with, the well known difference between French and English meanings of the same expression. The former has a distinct ethnic connotation, not always present in English. Secondly, the meaning of national identity in Québec and in the other provinces, or Canada as a whole, are not at all the same thing. The Québec population, at least its French element, constitutes a nation in a sense not matched elsewhere in Canada. This is not to say, as was noted above, that Newfoundlanders, British Columbians or other Canadians do not share a sense of identity linked to their province, region or country. But this sense of belonging and shared mental horizons is very different from Québec nationalism which, in its intensity, high focus and importance, is a classic form of nationalism, unknown in English Canada. This difference is reflected in the cultural policies pursued by Québec and the other jurisdictions in Canada. Québec attaches the greatest importance to this domain, pursues it with an imagination and vigour not equalled by the other provinces, and on a per capita basis spends a good deal more money on it. It does this because Québec governments, of whatever party complexion, value the arts more than do those in other provinces. They deem culture to be an important vehicle for the protection of the French language and a champion of the political aspirations of Quebeckers. The vast majority of francophone Québec artists and media people are strong nationalists.

It is often assumed in Québec, and particularly by this group, that Canadians outside the province do not really share a sense nationality, that a Canadian identity, compared to Québec’s, is negligible and hence of no consequence. By extension, a Canadian (or regional) culture is dismissed as being so anaemic, compared to that of Québec, as to be non-existent. A recent illustration is the statement by Diane Lemieux, almost as soon as she was appointed Québec’s Minister of Culture, to the effect that there is no real culture in Ontario. This provoked howls of protest in Ontario media (Mackie and Séguin, 2001; Conlogue, 2001; Martin, 2001; Ibbitson, 2001). The brouhaha was partly caused by the fact that Mme Lemieux and the Ontario journalists attached different meanings to the words they used. But it also reflects the fairly common view in Québec that Canada does not have a national culture. Anyone who has been across this country with eyes and ears open knows that this kind of argument is just plain silly.

All Canadian jurisdictions now support culture, in part because it contributes substantially to the economy and is an increasingly important component of employment in the service sector. But for many other reasons as well. Québec and Ottawa are driven in this domain even more by the belief that culture contributes to a sense of identity, and to a sense of group cohesion. It is not by accident that one of the components of “competitive federalism” in Canada is the perennial rivalry between Québec City and Ottawa with respect to subventions offered respectively to the St.Jean Baptiste Day celebrations in Québec and to Canada Day festivities throughout the country. The federal government not only seeks to attract and retain the emotional attachment of all Canadians, French and English, but also to bolster Canadian culture vis-à-vis American competition. The Department of Canadian Heritage is now a major, reasonably well financed agency assisting and orchestrating an enormous variety of cultural activities in large part so as to enable small Canada to thrive in the arts next to colossal USA.

Chapter 2, continued >

  


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